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Abstract
Open communication over the Internet poses a seri-
ous threat to countries with repressive regimes, lead-
ing them to develop and deploy censorship mechanisms
within their networks. Unfortunately, existing censor-
ship circumvention systems do not provide high avail-
ability guarantees to their users, as censors can iden-
tify, hence disrupt, the traffic belonging to these sys-
tems using today’s advanced censorship technologies.
In this paper we propose SWEET, a highly available
censorship-resistant infrastructure. SWEET works by
encapsulating a censored user’s traffic to a proxy server
inside email messages that are carried over by public
email service providers, like Gmail and Yahoo Mail.
As the operation of SWEET is not bound to specific
email providers we argue that a censor will need to block
all email communications in order to disrupt SWEET,
which is infeasible as email constitutes an important
part of today’s Internet. Through experiments with a
prototype of our system we find that SWEET’s perfor-
mance is sufficient for web traffic. In particular, regular
websites are downloaded within couple of seconds.
1. INTRODUCTION
Today’s Internet provides users with an environment
to freely communicate, and to exchange ideas and in-
formation with others from around the world. How-
ever, free communication continues to threaten repres-
sive regimes, as the open circulation of information and
speech among their citizens can pose serious threats
to their existence. Recent unrest in the middle east
demonstrates that the Internet can be widely used by
citizens under these regimes as a very powerful tool to
spread censored news and information, inspire dissent,
and organize events and protests. As a result, repres-
sive regimes extensively monitor their citizens’ access
to the Internet and restrict open access to public net-
works [38] by using different technologies, ranging from
simple IP address blocking (e.g., through access con-
trol lists) and DNS hijacking to more complicated and
resource-intensive Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [4,25].
With the use of censorship technologies, a number
of different systems were developed to retain the open-
ness of the Internet for the users living under repressive
regimes [3,8,13,17,22]. These systems are composed of
an ensemble of network hosts and use different computer
and networking technologies to evade the monitoring
and blocking performed by the censors. The earliest
circumvention tools are HTTP proxies [1,8,13] that sim-
ply intercept and manipulate a client’s HTTP requests,
defeating IP address blocking and DNS hijacking tech-
niques. The use of more advanced censorship technolo-
gies such as deep packet inspection [4,14], rendered the
use of HTTP proxies ineffective for circumvention. This
led to the advent of more advanced circumvention tools
such as Ultrasurf [3] and Psiphon [22], designed to evade
content filtering performed by the more advanced cen-
sors. In addition to special-purpose anti-censorship sys-
tems, many users have been using anonymity systems as
effective tools to evade Internet censorship [4,25]. These
systems are designed to hide a user’s activity over the
Internet, which can also help to evade Internet censor-
ship since the censor will not be able to determine the
network destination of a user’s traffic. Multiple designs
have been proposed for anonymity systems, including
the onion routing [35] and mix networks [11].
While these circumvention tools have helped, they
face several challenges that prevent them from being
a good choice for a longer-term solution to Internet
censorship. We believe that the biggest challenge to
existing circumvention systems is their lack of avail-
ability, meaning that a censor can disrupt their ser-
vice frequently or even disable them completely [19,27,
29, 30, 33]. The common reason leading to the men-
tioned lack of availability is that the network traffic
made by these systems can be distinguished from reg-
ular Internet traffic by censors, i.e., such systems are
not unobservable. This enables censors to disrupt/block
the communications made by their citizens to such cir-
cumvention systems. For example, the popular Tor
[17] network works by having users connect to an en-
semble of nodes with public IP addresses, which proxy
the user’s traffic to the requested, censored destina-
tions. This public knowledge about Tor’s IP addresses,
which is required to make Tor usable by users glob-
ally, can be/is used by censors to block their citizens
from accessing Tor [5,36]. To improve their availability,
recent proposals for circumvention aim to make their
traffic unobservable from censors [9, 16, 18, 20, 24, 37].
Several designs [9, 16, 18] seek unobservability by shar-
ing secret information with their clients, which are not
known to censors. For instance, the Tor network has re-
cently adopted the use of Tor Bridges, a set of volunteer
nodes connecting clients to the Tor network, whose IP
addresses are selectively distributed among Tor users
by Tor. Unfortunately, this approach poses another
challenge [27, 30], which is sharing such secret infor-
mation only with real users in a scalable manner such
that it is not disclosed to the censors pretending to be
users. A more recent approach in designing unobserv-
able, hence highly-available, circumvention systems is
to integrate censorship circumvention with the Internet
infrastructure [20, 21, 24, 37]. Telex [37], Cirripede [20],
and LAP [21] are example designs that suggest mod-
ifications to Internet infrastructure, e.g., routing deci-
sions, in order to hide users’ circumvented traffic from
their monitoring censors. Even though such systems
provide better availability promises, compared to tra-
ditional circumvention, their deployment requires sub-
stantial modifications to ISP networks, requiring coop-
eration from ISP operators and/or network equipment
vendors, presenting a substantial deployment challenge.
In this paper, we design and implement SWEET,
a censorship circumvention system that provides high
availability by leveraging the openness of email com-
munications. Figure 1 shows the main architecture of
SWEET. A SWEET client, confined by a censoring ISP,
tunnels its network traffic with blocked destinations in-
side a series of email messages that are exchanged be-
tween the client and an email server operated by SWEET’s
server. The SWEET server, then, acts as an Inter-
net proxy [26] for the client by proxying the encap-
sulated traffic to blocked Internet destinations. The
SWEET client uses an oblivious, public mail provider
(e.g., Gmail, Hotmail, etc.) to exchange the encapsu-
lating emails, rendering standard email filtering mecha-
nisms ineffective in identifying/blocking SWEET-related
emails. More specifically, to use SWEET for circum-
vention a client creates an email account with any pub-
lic email provider (e.g., Gmail, Hotmail) and obtains
SWEET’s client software from an out-of-bound chan-
nel (similar to other circumvention systems). The user
configures the installed SWEET software to use her
public email account, which sends/receives encapsulat-
ing emails messages on behalf of the user to/from the
publicly known email address of SWEET, e.g., tun-
nel@sweet.org. Note that there is no need for the user
to obtain any secret information, secret key, or secret
design information in order to use SWEET.
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Figure 2: Comparing availability and communi-
cation latency of several circumvention systems.
SWEET provides several key advantages as compared
to the existing circumvention systems. First, since email
is an essential service in today’s Internet it is very un-
likely that a censorship authority will block all email
communications to the outside world, due to different
financial and political reasons. This, along the fact that
SWEET can be reached through any email service, pro-
vides a high degree of availability for SWEET since a
censor will need to block all email traffic to the Inter-
net in order to block SWEET. Second, by using en-
crypted email messages SWEET is highly unobservable
from the censors. Third, the real-world deployment of
SWEET does not require cooperation of any third-party
entity, e.g., an ISP, a web destination, or even an spe-
cific email provider. Finally, unlike several recent pro-
posals [9, 16, 18, 24] a SWEET user does not have to
obtain any secret information in order to use SWEET,
providing high user convenience and ensuring the secu-
rity and privacy of the user.
In fact, the high availability of SWEET comes for
the price of higher, but bearable, communication laten-
cies. Figure 2 compares SWEET with several popular
circumvention systems regarding their availability and
communication latency. As our measurements in Sec-
tion 7 show, SWEET provides communication latencies
that are convenient for latency-sensitive activities like
web browsing (i.e., few seconds). Such additional, toler-
able latency of SWEET comes with the bonus of better
availability, as discussed in Section 5.2.
We have built a prototype implementation for the
SWEET system and evaluated its performance. We
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Figure 1: Overall architecture of SWEET.
have also prototyped two different designs for SWEET’s
client software, as proposed in this paper. The first
client design uses email protocols, e.g., POP3 and SMTP,
to communicate with the SWEET system, and our sec-
ond design is based on using the webmail interface. Our
measurements show that a SWEET client is able to
browse regular-sized web destinations with download
times in the order of couple of seconds.
In summary, this paper makes the following main
contributions: i) we propose a novel infrastructure for
censorship circumvention, SWEET, which provides high
availability, a feature missing in practical circumvention
systems; ii) we develop two prototype implementations
for SWEET (one using webmail and the other using
email exchange protocols) that allow the use of nearly
all email providers by SWEET clients; and, iii) we show
the feasibility of SWEET for practical censorship cir-
cumvention by measuring the communication latency
of SWEET for web browsing using our prototype im-
plementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; in Sec-
tion 2, we provide some background information and
discuss the related work on censorship circumvention.
In Section 3, we reviews our threat model. We provide
the detailed description of the proposed circumvention
system, SWEET, in Section 4. We discuss SWEET’s
censorship features, including its availability, in Sec-
tion 5 and compare it with the literature. Our proto-
type implementation and evaluations are presented in
Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
As a result of extensive censorship of the Internet by
repressive regimes, affected citizens have been looking
for effective tools to gain unrestricted access to the In-
ternet. Early censors used simple blocking techniques
such as IP address blocking and DNS hijacking; hence,
the early circumvention tools are based on proxying
the traffic to the blocked destinations, i.e., by using an
HTTP proxy [15]. Examples of proxy-based circumven-
tion tools include Anonymizer [8], Freenet [13] and Ul-
trasurf [3], that helped a number of users to bypass the
Internet censorship in the early days of Internet cen-
sorship. Proxying network traffic is also adopted by
the Tor anonymous communication network [17] to help
users bypass the censorship. Tor bridges [16] proxy the
censored clients’ traffic to the Tor network. The main
challenge with the Tor bridges and other proxy-based
circumvention systems is that keeping the IP address
of the proxies unknown to the censors is a challenging
problem [19, 27, 29, 30, 33]; a censor learning the IP ad-
dress of the proxies can easily block any access to them
and also identify their users.
The use of more advanced technologies by the censors,
e.g., content filtering using deep packet inspection, re-
sulted in the emergence of more complicated circumven-
tion systems [9,18,20,24,37]. These systems aim in pro-
tecting their availability by hiding the use of their sys-
tems from the censors in the first place. As an example,
Infranet [18] shares a secret key and some secret URL
addresses with a client, which is then used to estab-
lish an unobservable communication between the client
and the Infranet system, thereby enabling access the
blocked destination. As another example, Collage [9]
works by having a client and the Collage system secretly
agree on some user-generated content sharing websites,
e.g., flickr.com, and communicate using steganography.
Unfortunately, sharing secret information with a wide
range of clients is a serious challenge for these systems,
as a censor can obtain the same secret information by
pretending to be a client.
Some recent research suggests circumvention being
built into the Internet infrastructure to better provide
unobservability [20, 24, 37]. These systems rely on col-
laboration from some Internet routers that intercept
users’ traffic to uncensored destinations to establish covert
communication between the users and the censored des-
tinations. This provides a high degree of unobservabil-
ity: a client’s covert communication with a censored
destination appears to the censor to be benign traf-
fic with a non-prohibited destination. Telex [37] and
Cirripede [20] provide this unobservable communica-
tion without the need for some pre-shared secret in-
formation with the client, as the secret keys are also
covertly communicated inside the network traffic. Cir-
ripede [20] uses an additional client registration stage
that provides some advantages and limitations as com-
pared to Telex [37] and Decoy routing [24] systems.
Even though these systems are a large step forward in
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providing unobservable censorship circumvention their
real-world deployment is highly dependent on collabo-
ration from a number of ISPs/ASes, bringing into ques-
tion whether they will be deployed in the near future.
SWEET-like systems. There are two projects that
work in a similar manner to SWEET: the foe-project [2]
and the MailMyWeb [28] for-profit service. Instead of
tunneling traffic, which is the case in SWEET, these
systems simply download a requested website and send
it as an email attachment to the requesting user. This
highly limits therir performance compared to SWEET,
as discussed in Section 4.4.
3. THREAT MODEL
We assume that a user is confined inside a censoring
ISP, e.g., a user living under a repressive regime. The
censoring ISP blocks the user’s access to certain Internet
destinations, namely blocked destinations. We assume
that the censor uses today’s advanced filtering technolo-
gies, including IP address blocking, DNS hijacking, and
deep packet inspection techniques [25]. The censoring
ISP also monitors all of its egress/ingress traffic to de-
tect any use of circumvention techniques by users that
try to evade the censorship.
We assume that the censoring ISP’s censorship is con-
strained not to degrade the usability of the Internet. In
other words, even though the censoring ISP selectively
blocks certain Internet connections, she is not willing
to block key Internet services entirely. In particular,
the operation of SWEET system relies on the fact that
a censoring ISP does not block all email communica-
tions, even though she can selectively block email mes-
sages/email providers. We also assume that the cen-
soring ISP has as much information about SWEET as
any SWEET client (SWEET does not share any secret
information with its clients).
We also consider an active behavior for the censoring
ISP. An active censor, in addition to traffic monitor-
ing, manipulates its egress/ingress Internet traffic, e.g.,
by selectively dropping some packets, and adding addi-
tional latency to some packets, in an attempt to disrupt
the use of circumvention systems and/or to detect the
users of such systems. Again, such perturbations are
constrained to preserve the usability of the Internet for
benign users.
4. DESIGN OF SWEET
In this section, we describe the detailed design of
SWEET, our email-based censorship circumvention sys-
tem. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of SWEET.
SWEET tunnels network connections between a client
and a server, called SWEET server, inside email com-
munications. The assumption that a censor does not
block all email communications, as stated in our threat
model in Section 3, ensures a strong availability for
Figure 3: The main architecture of SWEET
server.
SWEET since it does not rely on any specific email
provider. Upon receiving the tunneled network pack-
ets, the SWEET server acts as a transparent proxy be-
tween the client and the network destinations requested
by the client. In the following, we describe the detailed
description of SWEET’s client and server architectures.
4.1 SWEET server
The SWEET server is a computer server running out-
side the censored region. The SWEET server helps a
censored user to evade censorship by proxying her traffic
to blocked Internet destinations. More specifically, the
SWEET server communicates with a censored user by
exchanging email messages that carry network packets
of the user’s tunneled traffic. Figure 3 shows the build-
ing blocks of the SWEET server, which is composed of
the following four main components:
① Email agent: The email agent component is an
IMAP and SMTP server that receives email messages
that contain the tunneled Internet traffic, being sent
by SWEET clients to SWEET’s publicized email ad-
dress tunnel@sweet.org. The email agent passes the
received email messages to another components of the
SWEET server, i.e., the converter agent and the regis-
tration agent, to get processed accordingly. The email
agent also sends email messages to SWEET clients, which
are generated by other components of SWEET server
and contain tunneled network packets or client registra-
tion information.
② Converter: The converter component processes the
emails passed by the email agent, and extracts the tun-
neled network packets. The converter, then, forwards
the extracted data to another component of the SWEET
server, the proxy agent component. Also, the converter
component receives network packets from the proxy agent
and converts them into email messages that are tar-
geted to the email address of corresponding SWEET
clients. The converter component then passes these
email messages to the email agent for delivery to their
intended recipients. As described later, the converter
encrypts/decrypts the email attachments of a user us-
ing a secret key shared with that user.
③ Proxy agent: The proxy agent proxies the network
packets of SWEET clients that are extracted by the con-
verter component, and sends them to the Internet des-
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tination requested by the clients. In other words, the
proxy agent makes a proxy connection with SWEET
clients, being tunneled inside the email-based commu-
nication. Through the established proxy connections,
the client requests access to Internet destinations, e.g.,
blocked web sites.
④ Registration agent: This component is in charge of
registering the email addresses of the SWEET clients,
prior to their use of SWEET. The information about
the registered clients can be used to ensure quality of
service for all users and prevent denial-of-service attacks
on the SWEET server. Additionally, the registration
agent shares a secret key with the client, which is used
to encrypt the tunneled information between the client
and the SWEET server.
The email agent of the SWEET server receives two
type of email messages; traffic emails, which contain
tunneled traffic from the clients (sent to tunnel@sweet.org
address), and registration emails, which carry client reg-
istration information (sent to register@sweet.org).
Client registration: Before the very first use of the
SWEET service, a client needs to register her email ad-
dress with the SWEET system. This is automatically
performed by the client’s SWEET software, through
the same email channel used for traffic tunneling. The
objective of client registration is twofold: to prevent
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and to share a secret key
between a client and the SWEET server. A denial-of-
service attack might be launched on the SWEET server
to disrupt its availability, e.g., through sending many
malformed emails on behalf of non-existing email ad-
dresses (this is discussed in Section 5). In order to regis-
ter (or update) the email address of a client, the client’s
SWEET software sends a registration email from the
user’s email address, e.g., user@gmail.com, to the SWEET’s
registration email address, i.e., register@sweet.org,
requesting registration. The email agent forwards all
received registration emails to the registration agent
(④) of the SWEET server. For any new registration
request, the registration agent generates and sends an
email to the requesting email address (through the email
agent) that contains a unique computational challenge
(e.g., [23]). After solving the challenge, the client soft-
ware sends a second email to register@sweet.org that
contains the solution to the challenge, along with a
Diffie-Hellman [34] public key KC = g
kC . If the client’s
response is verified by the registration agent the client’s
email address will be added to a registration list, that
contains the list of registered email addresses with their
expiration time. Also, the registration agent uses its
own Diffie-Hellman public key, KR = g
kR , to evaluate a
shared key kC,R = g
kRkC for the later communications
with the client. The registration agent adds this key
to the client’s entry in the registration list, to be used
for communications with that client. The client is able
to generate the same kC,R key using SWEET’s publicly
advertised public key and her own private key [34].
Tunneling the traffic: Any traffic email received
by the email agent is processed as follows: the email
agent (①) of SWEET server forwards the received traf-
fic email to the converter agent (②). The converter
agent processes the traffic email and extracts the tun-
neled information from the email. The converter agent,
then, decrypts the extracted traffic information (using
the key kC,R corresponding to the user) and sends it
to the proxy agent (③) of SWEET server. Finally, the
proxy processes the received packet as required, e.g.,
sends the packet to the requested destination. Similarly,
for any tunneled packet received from the proxied desti-
nations, the proxy agent sends it to the converter agent.
The converter agent encrypts the received packet(s) (us-
ing the corresponding kC,R), and generate a traffic email
that contain the encrypted data as email attachment.
Each email is targeted to the email address of the corre-
sponding client (e.g., by specifying the To: field of the
email message). The generated email is passed to the
email agent, who sends the email to the corresponding
client. Note that to improve the latency performance
of the connection, small packets that arrive at the same
time get attached to the same email message.
4.2 SWEET client
To use SWEET, a SWEET client needs to obtain a
copy of SWEET’s client software and install it on her
machine. The client further needs to have an email ac-
count with a public email provider, e.g., Gmail1 mail
service. The choice of an encrypted versus plaintext
email service makes a tradeoff between the usage un-
observability and the performance. The use of an en-
crypted email service, e.g., Gmail, improves the usage
unobservability while using a plaintext email service,
e.g., Hotmail, improves the connection’s throughput;
this is discussed in Section 5.1. A client needs to con-
figure the installed SWEET’s software with informa-
tion about her email account. Prior to the first use of
SWEET by a client, the client software registers the
email address of its user with the SWEET server and
obtains a shared secret key kC,R, as described in Sec-
tion 4.1.
We propose two designs for SWEET client software: a
protocol-based design, which uses standard email proto-
cols to exchange email with client’s email provider, and
a webmail-based design, which uses the webmail inter-
face of the client’s email provider. We describe these
two designs in the following.
4.2.1 Protocol-based design
Figure 4 shows the main elements of the protocol-
based design of SWEET client. This is composed of
1https://www.gmail.com
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three main components:
❶ Web Browser: A SWEET client needs to use a
web browser to render the web sites accessed through
SWEET. The client can use any web browser that sup-
ports proxying of connections, e.g., Google Chrome, In-
ternet Explorer, or Mozilla Firefox. The client needs to
configure her web browser to use a local proxy server,
e.g., by setting localhost:4444 as the HTTP/SOCKS
proxy in the browser’s settings. The client can use
two different web browsers for browsing with and with-
out SWEET in order to avoid the need for frequent
re-configurations of the browser. Alternatively, some
browsers (e.g., Google Chrome , and Mozilla Firefox)
allow a user to have multiple browsing profiles, hence, a
user can setup two profiles for browsing with and with-
out SWEET.
❷ Email Agent: This component sends and receives
SWEET emails thorough the client’s public email ac-
count. The client needs to configure the email agent
with the settings of the SMTP and IMAP/POP3 servers
of her public email account. The client also needs to
provide the email client with the required login infor-
mation of her email account.
❸ Converter: This component sits in the middle of the
web browser and the email agent, and converts SWEET
emails into network packets and vice versa. The con-
verter uses the keys shared with SWEET, kC,R, to en-
crypt/decrypt email contents.
Once the client enters a URL into the configured web
browser (component ❶), the browser makes a proxy
connection to the local port that the converter (❸) is
listening on (as specified in the proxy settings of the
browser). The converter accepts the proxy connection
from the browser and keeps the state of the established
TCP/IP connections. For packets that are received
from the web browser the converter generates traffic
emails, targeted to tunnel@sweet.org, having the re-
ceived packets as encrypted email attachments (using
the key kC,R). Such emails are passed to the email
agent (❷) that sends the emails to the SWEET server
through the public email provider of the client (as con-
figured).
The email client is also configured to receive emails
from the client’s email account through an email re-
trieval protocol, e.g., IMAP or POP3. This allows the
email agent to continuously look for new emails from
the SWEET server. Once new emails are received the
email agent passes them to the converter, who in turn
extracts the packet information from the emails, de-
crypts them, and sends them to the web browser over
the existing TCP/IP connection with the browser.
4.2.2 Webmail-based design
As an alternative approach to the protocol-based de-
sign described above, the SWEET client can use the
Figure 4: The protocol-based design for SWEET
client.
Figure 5: The webmail-based design for SWEET
client.
webmail interface of the client’s public email provider
to exchange emails with the SWEET server.
Figure 5 shows the main architecture of our webmail-
based design. The main difference with the protocol-
based design is that in this case the email agent (com-
ponent ❷) uses a web browser to exchange emails. More
specifically, the email agent uses its web browser to
open a webmail interface with the client’s email account,
using the user’s authentication credentials for logging
in. Through this HTTP/HTTPS connection, the email
agent communicates with the SWEET server by sending
and receiving emails. The rest of the webmail-based de-
sign is similar to the protocol-based design. If desired,
the email agent can use the same web browser that the
user uses for normal web browsing.
4.3 The choice of the proxy protocol
As mentioned before, the SWEET server uses a proxy
agent that receives the tunneled traffic of clients and es-
tablishes connections to the requested destinations. We
consider the use of both SOCKS [26] and HTTP [32]
proxies in the design of SWEET, as each provides unique
advantages. To provide the users with both options, our
SWEET server’s proxy agent runs a SOCKS proxy and
an HTTP proxy in parallel, each running on a different
port. A user can choose to use the type of proxy by
configuring her SWEET client to connect to the corre-
sponding port number.
The use of the SOCKS proxy allows the client to make
any IP connection through the SWEET system, includ-
ing dynamic web communications, such as Javascript or
AJAX, and instant messaging services. In contrast, an
HTTP proxy only allows access to HTTP destinations.
However, an HTTP proxy may speed up connections to
such destinations by using HTTP-layer optimizations
such as caching or pre-fetching of web objects.
4.4 An alternative approach: Web download
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A trivial approach in providing censorship circum-
vention using email is to download an entire webpage
and attach it as an email attachment to email mes-
sages that are targeted to the requesting users. In fact,
this approach is under development by the open-source
foe project [2], and the for-profit service of MailMy-
Web [28]. Unfortunately, this simple approach only pro-
vides a limited access to the Internet: a user can only
access static websites. In particular, this approach can-
not be used to access destinations that require end-to-
end encryption, contain dynamic web applications like
HTML5 and Javascript sockets, or need user login infor-
mation. Also, this approach does not support accessing
web destinations that require a live Internet connection,
e.g., video streaming websites, instant messaging, etc.
In fact, the MailMyWeb service uses some heuristics to
tackle some of these shortcomings partially, which are
privacy-invasive and inefficient. For example, in order
to access login-based websites MailMyWeb requests a
user to send her login credentials to MailMyWeb by
email. Also, a user can request for videos hosted only
on the YouTube video sharing website, which are then
downloaded by MailMyWeb and sent as email attach-
ments; this causes a large delay between the time a
video is requested until it is has received by the user.
SWEET, on the other hand, provides a comprehensive
web browsing experience to its users since it can tunnel
any kind of IP traffic.
5. DISCUSSIONS AND COMPARISONS
In this section we evaluate SWEET’s circumvention
capabilities by discussing important features that are
essential for an effective circumvention.
5.1 Unobservability and the use of encryption
We say a circumvention tool provides unobservability
if censors are not able to identify the users of that tool
by monitoring the Internet traffic of their citizens. Un-
observability has been considered in designing several
recent circumvention systems [20, 24, 37] as a mecha-
nism to ensure the availability of the service.
Usage unobservability can be a very desirable prop-
erty to users living under repressive regimes, as it can
reduce a user’s risk of suspicion by the government.
However, if desired, SWEET users may disable unob-
servability while retaining availability. This provides
the benefit of reduced latency. It comes at the expense
of observability, but users in some environments may
wish to retain reliable anonymous communications yet
do not fear reprisal from their government. SWEET
users have the option to use SWEET in a highly unob-
servable manner, or to trade off unobservability for bet-
ter communication performance. More specifically, the
use of an encryption-enabled email service (e.g., Gmail,
Hushmail2) with SWEET provides usage unobservabil-
ity for the user, as the censor will not be able to see the
recipient’s email address, e.g., tunnel@sweet.org. On
the other side, the use of plaintext email services (e.g.,
Yahoo!, Hotmail) provides better availability as repres-
sive regimes occasionally disrupt or block the access to
encryption-enabled services, including encrypted emails
(yet they do not block all email communications). As a
recent instance, Iran blocked all HTTPS connections of
its citizen during the second week of February 2012 [7],
the anniversary of Iran’s green movement in 2009. In
addition, while using an encryption-enabled email, to
ensure unobservability the user’s email traffic patterns
should mimic that of normal email communications,
e.g., to defeat traffic analysis by a censor; this limits
the bandwidth available to the user, as discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2.
5.2 Availability
SWEET’s availability is tied to the assumption dis-
cussed previously that a censor is not willing to block all
email communications, as it would degrade the usability
of the Internet for its users. As the use of SWEET does
not require an email account with any specific email
provider, users can always find an email service to get
connected to SWEET.
IP filtering and DNS hijacking techniques would not
be able to stop SWEET traffic as a SWEET user’s traf-
fic is destined to her public email provider, but not
to an IP address or nameserver belonging to SWEET
system. Another technique used by today’s sophisti-
cated censors is deep packet inspection (DPI). The use
of encryption-enabled email renders DPI ineffective, as
the email headers get encrypted and the DPI will not
be able to analyze the email headers in order to de-
tect the email addresses of SWEET, to hence block the
traffic. In the case of plaintext emails, to defeat DPI
SWEET server can provide different email aliases to
different users or to change its public email address fre-
quently. Note that generating email aliases has no cost
for SWEET server and can be done with no limit. In
the worst case, a user can obtain her specialized email
address through an out of band channel, or by con-
necting through a encryption-enabled email account (as
mentioned before the DPI is ineffective on encryption-
enabled emails).
As another approach for disrupting the operation of
SWEET, a censor might try to launch a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on SWEET server. The common tech-
niques for DoS attacks, e.g., ICMP flooding and SYN
flooding, can be mitigated by protecting the SWEET
server using up-to-date firewalls. Alternatively, a ma-
licious entity (e.g., a censor) can try to exhaust the
SWEET service by sending disruptive traffic through
2www.hushmail.com
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the email communication channel of SWEET. In other
words, a censor can play the role of a SWEET client and
send Internet traffic through its SWEET client software
in a way that breaks or overloads the SWEET server.
As an example, the attacker can flood the SWEET’s
SOCKS proxy by initiating many incomplete SOCKS
connections, or sending SYN floods. A censor could
send such attacking requests on behalf of a number of
rogue (non-existing) email addresses, to render an email
blacklist maintained by SWEET server ineffective in
preventing such attacks. As a result, SWEET server
should deploy effective mechanisms to protect against
possible DoS attacks. One effective mechanism is to
require a new user to register her email address with
SWEET server prior to her first use of SWEET. Such
registration can be performed in an unobservable man-
ner by SWEET’s client software through the email com-
munication channel (see Section 4.1). Also, to ensure
the quality of service for all users, the SWEET server
can limit the use of SWEET by putting a cap on the
volume of traffic communicated by each registered email
address.
5.3 Other properties of SWEET
Confidentiality: As mentioned before, SWEET en-
crypts the tunneled traffic, i.e., the email attachments
are encrypted using a key shared between a user and
SWEET server. This ensures the confidentiality of SWEET
user communications from any entity wiretapping the
traffic, including the censorship authorities and the pub-
lic email provider. Note that the email attachments
are encrypted even if the user to choose a plaintext
email service. To make a connection confidential from
SWEET server the user can use an end-to-end encryp-
tion with the final destination, e.g., by using HTTPS.
Alternatively, a user can use SWEET to connect to an-
other circumvention system, like Anonymizer [10], to
ensure confidentiality from SWEET server.
Ease of deployment: We argue that SWEET can be
easily deployed on the Internet and provide service to
a wide range of users. First of all, SWEET is low-cost
and needs few resources for deployment. It can be de-
ployed using a single server that runs a few light-weight
processes, including a mail server and a SOCKS proxy.
To service in a large scale SWEET server can be de-
ployed in a distributed manner by several machines in
different geographic locations. Secondly, the operation
of SWEET is standalone and does not rely on collabo-
ration from other entities, e.g., end-hosts or ISPs. This
provides a significant advantage to recent research that
relies on collaboration from ISPs [20, 24, 37], or end-
hosts [9, 18]. In fact, the easy setup and low-resources
of SWEET’s deployment allows it to be implemented
by individuals with different levels of technical exper-
tise. For instance, an ordinary home user can deploy a
personal SWEET server to help her friends in censored
regions evade censorship, or a corporate network can
setup such system for its agents residing in a censored
country.
User convenience: As mentioned before, a recent
study [10] surveying the use of circumvention tools in
censored countries shows that users give the most pref-
erence to the ease of use when choosing a circumvention
tool. The use of SWEET is simple and requires few
resources from a client. A SWEET client only needs
to install the provided client software, that can be ob-
tained from out-of-band channels like social networks
or downloaded from the Internet. Due to its simple de-
sign, an expert user can also develop the client software
herself. In addition to SWEET software, the user needs
to have an email account with a public email provider,
and needs to know the public information related to
SWEET, e.g., the email addresses of SWEET.
No need to share secrets: To ensure availability
and unobservability, several circumvention tools need to
share some secret information with their users, in order
to initiate the circumvented a connection [9, 16, 18, 24].
This is a significant limitation, as keeping such infor-
mation secret from the censorship authorities is a hard
problem, and the disclosure of such secret information
breaks their unobservability and availability promises.
A SWEET user does not require to obtain any secret
information from the SWEET server.
6. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We have prototyped the SWEET circumvention sys-
tem and measured its performance.
6.1 Server implementation
We implement the SWEET server on a Linux ma-
chine. The machine runs Ubuntu 10.04 LTS and has a
2 GHz quad-core CPU and 4 GB of memory. We run
Postfix3, a simple email server that supports basic func-
tions. Postfix listens for new emails targeted to the reg-
ister@sweet.organd tunnel@sweet.org email addresses.
Postfix stores the received emails into designated file di-
rectories that are continuously watched by the converter
and registration agent components of SWEET server.
Each stored email has a unique name, concatenating
the email id of its corresponding client and an increasing
counter. The converter agent is a simple Python-based
program that runs in the background and continuously
checks the folder for new emails. The converter also con-
verts proxied packets, passed by SWEET’s proxy, into
email messages and sends them to their intended clients.
For the proxy agent, we use Squid4 as our HTTP proxy
and Suttree5 as our SOCKS proxy. Squid runs on a lo-
3http://www.postfix.org/
4http://www.squid-cache.org/
5http://suttree.com/code/proxy/
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cal port and listens for connections from the converter
component.
6.2 Client implementation
We implement both protocol-based and webmail-based
versions of the SWEET client.
Protocol-based design The client prototype is built
on a desktop machine, running Linux Ubuntu 10.04
TLS. We set up a web browser to use the local port
”localhost:9034”as the SOCKS/HTTP proxy. The con-
verter component of SWEET client is a simple python
script that listens on port 9034 for connections, e.g.,
from our web browser. Finally, we implement the email
agent of SWEET client using Fetchmail6, a popular
client software for sending and retrieval of emails through
email protocols. We generate a free Gmail account and
configure Fetchmail to receive emails through IMAP7
and POP38 servers of Gmail, and to send emails through
the SMTP server of Gmail9. Note that our design does
not rely on Gmail, and the client software can be set up
with any email account.
Webmail-based design Our webmail-based imple-
mentation also runs on Linux Ubuntu 10.04 TLS. Our
webmail-based implementation uses a Google Chrome
browser for making connections through SWEET, con-
figured to use the local port of ”localhost:9034” as a
proxy. Also, the webmail-based design uses the same
converter component as the one used in the protocol-
based prototype.
We prototype the web-based email agent by running a
UserScript10 inside the Mozilla Firefox11 web browser.
More specifically, we install a Firefox extension, called
Greasemonkey12, that allows a user to run her own
JavaScript, i.e., Userscript, while browsing certain des-
tinations. We write a UserScript that runs in Gmail’s
webmail interface and listens for the receipt of new
email messages. Our UserScript saves new emails in
a local directory, which is watched by the converter
component. Note that the Firefox browser is directly
connected to the Internet and does not use any proxies
(user needs to use the configured Chrome browser to
surf the web through SWEET).
7. EVALUATION
We evaluate SWEET using our prototype implemen-
tation, described in Section 6.
7.1 Performance
6http://www.fetchmail.info/
7https://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=78799
8https://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=13287
9https://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=78799
10http://userscripts.org/
11http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new/
12https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/greasemonkey/
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Figure 6: The CDF of the time that a SWEET
email takes to travel from the SWEET client to
the SWEET server (100 runs).
We use Gmail as the oblivious mail provider in our
experiments. Our SWEET server is located in Urbana,
IL, resulting in approximately 2000 miles of geographic
distance between the SWEET server and Gmail’s email
server (we locate Gmail’s location from its IP address).
Figure 6 shows the CDF of the time that a SWEET
email (carrying the tunnelled traffic) sent by a SWEET
client takes to reach our SWEET server (the reverse
path takes a similar time). As the figure shows, around
90% of SWEET emails take less than 3 seconds to reach
the SWEET server, which is very promising considering
the high data capacity of these email messages. Note
that based on our measurements, most of this delay
comes from email handling (e.g, spam checks, making
SMTP connections, etc.) performed by the oblivious
mail provider (Gmail in our experiments), but not from
the network latency (the network latency and client la-
tency constitute only tens of milliseconds of the total
latency). As a result, the latency would be very simi-
lar for users with an even longer geographical distance
from the oblivious mail server.
Client registration Before being able to request data
from Internet destinations, a user needs to be registered
by the SWEET server. Figure 7 shows the time taken to
exchange registration messages between a client and the
SWEET server. Note that the client registration needs
to be performed only once for a long period of time.
The figure shows that more than 90% of registrations
establish in less than 8 seconds (with an average of 6.4
seconds).
We use two metrics to evaluate the latency perfor-
mance of SWEET in browsing websites: the time to
the first appearance (TFA) and the total browsing time
(TBT). As described by its name, the TFA is the time
taken to receive the first response from a requested
web destination. The TFA is an important metric in
measuring user convenience during web browsing. For
instance, suppose that a client requests a URL, e.g.,
http://www.cnn.com/some_news.html. By the TFA
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Figure 7: The CDF distribution of the registra-
tion time.
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Figure 8: The CDF of the time to the first ap-
pearance (TFA) of SWEET.
time the client receives the first HTTP RESPONSE(s)
from the destination, which include the URL’s text parts
(perhaps the news article) along with the URLs of other
objects on that page, e.g., images, ads hosted by other
websites, etc. At this time the client can start reading
the received portion of the website (e.g., the news arti-
cle), while her browser sends requests for other objects
on that webpage. On the other hand, the total browsing
time (TBT) is the time after which the browser finishes
fetching all of the objects in the requested URL.
Using our prototype we measure the end-to-end web
browsing latency for the client to reach different web
destinations. Figure 8 shows the time to the first ap-
pearance (TFA) using SWEET for the top 10 web URLs
from Alexa’s most-visited sites ranking [6]. As can be
seen, the median of the TFA is about 5 seconds across
all experiments, which is very promising to user conve-
nience.
On the other hand, Figure 9 shows the total browsing
time (TBT) using SWEET for the same set of destina-
tions (50 runs for each website). As can be seen, the des-
tinations that contain more web objects (e.g., yahoo and
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Figure 9: The CDF of the TBT time using
SWEET.
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Figure 10: Comparing the average latency of
SWEET and Tor.
linkedin) take more time to get completely fetched (note
that after the TFA time the user can start reading the
webpage until all of the objects are received). We also
run similar experiments through the popular Tor [35]
anonymous network to compare its latency performance
with SWEET. Figure 10 compares the cumulative time
CDF for SWEET and Tor systems. As expected, our
simple implementation of SWEET takes more time than
Tor to browse a web page, however, it provides a suffi-
cient performance for normal web browsing. This is in
particular significant considering the strong availability
of SWEET compared to other circumvention systems,
as discussed in this paper. Additionally, we believe that
further optimizations on SWEET server’s proxy (like
those implemented by Tor exit nodes) will further im-
prove the latency of SWEET. Our techniques are also
amenable to standard methods to improve web latency,
such as plugin-based caching and compression, which
can make web browsing tolerable in high delay environ-
ments [12].
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7.2 Traffic analysis
A powerful censor can perform traffic analysis to de-
tect the use of SWEET, e.g., by comparing a user’s
email communications with that of a typical email user.
As a result, a SWEET user who is concerned about un-
observability needs to ensure that her SWEET email
communications mimic that of a normal user (as dis-
cussed in Section 5.1, a user who does not fear reprisal
from her government might opt to ignore unobservabil-
ity in order to gain a higher communication bandwidth).
It should be mentioned that such traffic analysis is ex-
pensive for censors considering the large volume of email
communications; it is estimated13 that 294 billion email
messages were sent per day in 2011.
Figure 11 shows the number of emails sent and re-
ceived by a SWEET client to browse different websites.
We observe that for any particular website the num-
ber of emails does not change at different runs. As
can be seen, most of the web sites finish in less than
three SWEET emails in each direction. The exception
is the Yahoo web page as it contains many web objects,
each hosted by different URLs (note that the number
of email messages affects the latency performance only
sub-linearly, since some emails are sent and received si-
multaneously.). Also, the average number in each way
of a connection is about 4 emails. A recent study [31] on
email statistics predicts that an average user will send
35 emails and will receive 75 emails per day in 2012
(the study predicts the numbers to increase annually).
In addition, membership in mailing lists14 and Inter-
net groups1516 is popular among Internet users, pro-
ducing even more emails by normal email users. As
an indication of the popularity of such services, Ya-
hoo in 2010 announced17 that 115 million unique users
are collectively members of more than 10 million Yahoo
Groups. Based on the mentioned statistics, we estimate
that a conservative SWEET user can perform 35-70 web
downloads per day, or make 10-20 interactive web con-
nections, while ensuring unobservability of SWEET us-
age. Once again, as discussed in Section 5.1, we argue
that unobservability is a concern only to special citi-
zens; hence, we believe that normal citizens would use
SWEET ignoring the possibilities of traffic analysis by
a censor.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented SWEET, a deployable
system for unobservable communication with Internet
destinations. SWEET works by tunneling network traf-
fic through widely-used public email services such as
13http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/
14http://gcc.gnu.org/lists.html
15http://groups.yahoo.com
16http://groups.google.com
17http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Search-Engines/Yahoo-Refreshes-Upgrades-Some-Products-775120/
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Figure 11: The number of emails sent and re-
ceived by a SWEET client to get one of the web-
sites from Alexa’s top ten ranking.
Gmail, Yahoo Mail, and Hotmail. Unlike recently-proposed
schemes that require a collection of ISPs to instrument
router-level modifications in support of covert commu-
nications, our approach can be deployed through a small
applet running at the user’s end host, and a remote
email-based proxy, simplifying deployment. Through
an implementation and evaluation in a wide-area de-
ployment, we find that while SWEET incurs some ad-
ditional latency in communications, these overheads are
low enough to be used for interactive accesses to web
services. We feel our work may serve to accelerate de-
ployment of censorship-resistant services in the wide
area, guaranteeing high availability.
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